by Kirsten Berkhout
The issues faced by modern feminism, from abortion to consent laws, parental leave to sex worker protection, are all typically framed through a specific feminist lens: choice feminism.[i] This lens orients feminist issues onto the concept of choice—and in seeking to unify the previously divided feminist movement on the premise that freedom is expressed in our capacity to choose, choice feminism asks us to “abstain from judging” all women’s choices.[ii] However, feminists such as Lori Marso have argued that it is precisely this uncritical endorsement of all choices that undermines efforts to eradicate patriarchy; choice feminism perhaps even functions as a mechanism of patriarchy in and of itself.[iii] In this essay I will argue that choice feminism can be conceptualised as a reaction to the divisions that characterised feminism in the 1970s, primarily exemplified in the “sex-wars”.[iv] In forcibly unifying two opposing approaches to feminism, choice feminism a) fails to challenge the problematic construction of feminine desires, and b) reinforces the gender binary in which femininity is deemed inherently inferior, ultimately acting to bolster the patriarchy.
The feminist movement, at least in the West, is primarily understood in terms of the wave metaphor.[v] The conceptual framework of ‘waves’, divides the movement generationally, from the suffragettes in the first wave, to the feminists of today. Despite the fluid imagery the wave metaphor suggests, the generations tend to be categorised rigidly, with distinct ideological differences between them. In mainstream discourse, including university classrooms, feminist ideas are categorised by associated time period and feminists themselves deemed to be party to one single wave, one distinct category. However, the waves of feminism are markedly complex. The third wave of feminism supposedly ended in 2012, placing us now in the fourth wave.[vi] However, one of the most prominent features attributed to the third wave, choice feminism, still dominates contemporary feminist discourse, and ideas attributed to the fourth wave, such as intersectionality, can be traced back decades at the very least.[vii] The seemingly nonsequential order and ideological overlap of the waves has led to critiques of the metaphor as offering at best a limited, at worst an inadequate representation of historical and contemporary feminism.[viii] Considering the diversity of ideas in the feminist movement at any given moment, it seems disingenuous to confine specific ideas to one particular wave, let alone assign the people with those ideas to a specific time period. Categories such as the waves seem to provide a practical use, as a standpoint for analysing and understanding the movement—however to avoid the problems associated with the generational categorisation of the ‘wave’ metaphor, I intend to set it aside and instead look to the specific content of relevant feminist ideas.
Choice feminism can be understood as a reaction to the stark divide that characterised the feminist movement of the 1970s.[ix] While it certainly was not restricted to the topic of sex, this divide was clearly exemplified by issues of sexuality and pornography. Again, in categorising feminism and feminists we risk simplifying what are in reality complex ideas and complex people, however the “sex-wars” were characterised specifically by two opposing sides. On one side, were feminists who believed in embracing feminine aesthetics and sexuality as a form of empowerment: they sought to reclaim themselves as sexual beings. The other side of this divide viewed sex, pornography, and the sexualising of women in heteronormative contexts as inherently oppressive, arguing that liberation requires the rejection of hyper-sexualised femininity.[x] We can understand these distinct ideological divides in terms of empowerment versus liberation: each camp seeing the other as complicit in women’s oppression. Choice feminism arose in the 1990s and attempted to resolve this infighting by recognising all women’s choices as equally feminist.[xi] Whether you embrace your sexual side, or reject sex altogether, everything boils down the simple idea of choosing—which we are all free to do…right? However, in placating this conflict, choice feminism has arguably quashed critical and constructive discussions on the role of social construction in the formation of our desires, and the problematic nature of the gender binary—both of which can be seen as core feminist issues. Taking a closer look at feminism today, the empowerment versus liberation divide still exists but under the guise of personal choice, which, I will argue, ultimately “serves to protect the most powerful and privileged in any society.”[xii]
Let us begin with the empowerment perspective. A concept that remains rampant in consumer culture, empowerment endorses the diverse expression of women’s desires, particularly in terms of bodies and sexuality.[xiii] Apparently uninhibited by patriarchal and religious ideals of purity, empowerment oftentimes materialises as embracing feminine aesthetics (e.g. wearing dresses and make-up) and reclaiming agency in sexuality, be it through casual sex or even sex work. However, the perfunctory encouragement of these choices, simply on the basis of desire, fails to ask where our desires come from. As we will see, it is far from coincidental that women seem to have an inherent attraction to standards of female beauty and sexuality that match those set by patriarchy.[xiv]
In terms of feminine desires, Martha Nussbaum refers to the development of “adaptive preferences”.[xv] In patriarchy, a woman’s value is often reduced to her attractiveness and in many ways her body is merely an object or instrument: the sole purpose of feminine sexuality being appealing, and becoming subservient, to men.[xvi] For an oppressive system such as patriarchy, it is efficient to have the subjugated group, in this instance women, accept, or even desire, the conditions of their oppression. [xvii] Actively desiring ‘femininity’, whether it be in terms of wanting to look attractive or perform submissive sexual roles, may be directly linked to societal conditions that have shaped our desires to fit the expectations of patriarchy. Nussbaum and other adaptive preference theorists have considered that this internalised conformity may even be strategic for surviving social ostracisation or rejection—by desiring the conditions of their oppression, women can more comfortably cope with the subjugation they deem inevitable. The realisation that the mechanisms of patriarchy “are everywhere, even inside [our] own mind[s]” and that our desires may, in fact, not be entirely our own, feels violating. [xviii] We may be labelling our desires as innate and autonomous, simply to alleviate the discomfort that comes with recognising that patriarchy has crept its way into something we consider to be authentically our own. [xix]
The influence of patriarchy on our desires is only one half of the story: the impact of fulfilling those desires is another pressing issue. Not only are we ourselves influenced by patriarchy, but in accepting and performing its standards, in terms of beauty and sexual roles, we are to some degree perpetuating it. The choice to wear makeup, get cosmetic surgery, or even simply to remove body hair, may not exist in a societal vacuum as choice feminism implies. On both individual and collective levels, the widespread representation of women as smooth-skinned, wrinkle-free, hairless images of perfection—be it the women around us, all perfectly groomed, or the airbrushed model on the movie screen—insinuates “that a woman’s body is not acceptable the way it naturally is.”[xx] These choices likely contribute to beauty standards that privilege white, wealthy, European bodies, and marginalise intersectional identities. Instead, by questioning the notion of unambiguous choice, we can recognise both the cultural contexts in which our choices are located and the reality that the decisions of women, the choices of people—particularly privileged people in the West—will “always impact the lives of other[s].”[xxi]
In order to challenge patriarchy, must we then reject all of our apparently conditioned feminine desires? Those on the other side of the sex wars would probably say yes: their agenda being the disruption of, and liberation from, the public/private binary through the declaration that the personal is political.[xxii] In terms of sex and sexuality, their liberation meant rejecting the “sexualised… self-presentation [that] has become a normative requirement” for women in Western cultures.[xxiii] Sex roles were perceived as not simply personal acts, but ones that were complicit in the oppression of women. Sexual portrayals of women, particularly in advertising and pornography, were seen as conditioning men “to eroticise submissiveness, and women to believe submissiveness [is] erotically essential.”[xxiv] Liberation oriented feminism certainly recognises Nussbaum’s concept of adaptive preferences. They then, however, turn their gaze to other societal roles that perpetuate this expectation for feminine passivity, particularly in the home.[xxv] Domestic work and traditional motherhood are also seen as contributing to the sexist expectation for women to submit to male power. So, just as one must reject heteronormative sexualisation, liberation feminism advocates for the rejection of all patriarchally enforced ‘feminine’ roles, i.e. the housewife.
The implications of this rejection, however, are more complex than they may seem. By “condemning housework and the lives of housewives as… lacking creativity,” liberation is defined as freeing women from the confines of the home, allowing them to pursue and maintain careers.[xxvi] Following this conception of liberation, problematic implications regarding femininity arise. As Teresa Ebert puts it:
To perform the work required of them as they enter the labour force, women find it necessary to acquire cultural attributes previously reserved for men (such as assertiveness, analytical thinking, ambition, and leadership) and to occupy positions and perform functions previously defined as masculine.[xxvii]
In defining these masculine attributes as desirable, as liberating, feminine roles are defined inherently in opposition, as inferior, constricting—a trademark of the patriarchal gender binary. This recognises the subjugation that women suffer within the binary, and yet still functions within that same binary as we tell women that, to be liberated, they must simply be like men.[xxviii] If the goal is for all women to be freed from the suffocating gender binary, they will not do so by simply reversing individual roles in the binary, as then the binary remains intact and necessitates the subjugation of another.[xxix]
As such, despite liberating the housewives, someone must perform the domestic tasks that “reproduce the conditions necessary for living.”[xxx] As I see it, there are three discernible options here. The first is that, in a heterosexual household, the man and woman, who now both have the liberty to pursue careers and work, share the domestic workload. This, however, is rarely the case, and perhaps understandably so considering the previously discussed undervaluing of domestic labour: if women had to be freed from it—it is deemed oppressive and thus unappealing for anyone.[xxxi] The second is that women continue to do the unpaid domestic work on top of paid work. Around the world, even as women join men in the workforce, this is overwhelmingly the case—women do almost double the total work.[xxxii] The third option, less common but no less harmful, is that the wealthy or otherwise privileged women, who are lucky enough to have been liberated from housework to focus on their professional career, hire someone to do the domestic work. It is typically marginalised women, women of colour, and women in poverty who are hired to do this work, and are underpaid for it.[xxxiii]
As we collectively turn up our noses at domestic work, it is already marginalised groups that pick up the slack. Albeit inadvertently, the “male/female binary opposition” is only reinforced by the devaluation of feminine attributes and roles.[xxxiv] Not only are men disincentivised from participating in the domestic work, but care-oriented roles, such as teachers, nurses, and carers, all professions dominated by women, are devalued, and thus underpaid.[xxxv] By lifting women up, we are defining all attributes associated with femininity as down, reinforcing the fact that “patriarchy is all pervasive and treats females universally as inferior.”[xxxvi]
From empowerment in terms of aesthetics and sexuality to liberation from oppressive domesticity—as well as anything in-between—choice feminism endorses it all. For a woman to simply have the freedom to express herself in her choices is paramount. This conception is prevalent in the framing of feminist issues today and it fails to critically analyse the relationship between our desires, patriarchy, and other women. Undoubtedly there is more to be said about other aspects of contemporary feminism—how difficult it is to get anything right, as a woman, as a feminist, in patriarchy. Ideas such as intersectionality, which has long been excluded from white, middle-class feminism, seem to be gaining traction in the feminist movement and pose a promising challenge to this problematic conception of choice. However, such ideas are yet to loosen the chokehold choice feminism has on the mainstream movement today.
Kirsten is studying a Bachelor of Advanced Humanities at UQ, majoring in Philosophy. She is particularly passionate about the philosophy of education, and its association with psychology and political science. She is also (as evident above) an avid feminist philosopher—again dabbling in the intersection of philosophy, psychology, and politics.
ENDNOTES
[i] Rachel Thwaites, “Making a choice or taking a stand? Choice feminism, political engagement and the contemporary feminist movement,” Feminist Theory 18(1) (2017): 55, https://doi.org/10.1177/1464700116683657.
[ii] Michaele L Ferguson, “Choice Feminism and the Fear of Politics,” Perspectives on Politics 8, no. 1 (2010): 248, http://www.jstor.org/stable/25698532.
[iii] Lori J Marso, “Feminism’s Quest for Common Desires,” Perspectives on Politics 8, no. 1 (2010): 263, http://www.jstor.org/stable/25698534.
[iv] Claire Snyder-Hall, “Third-Wave Feminism and the Defense of ‘Choice’,” Perspectives on Politics 8, no. 1 (2010): 257-58, http://www.jstor.org/stable/25698533.
[v] Kathleen Laughlin, “Is It Time to Jump Ship? Historians Rethink the Waves Metaphor,” Feminist Formations 22, no. 1 (2010): 76, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40835345.
[vi]Tara Anand, “A Brief Summary of The Third Wave of Feminism,” Feminism In India, April 27, 2018, https://feminisminindia.com/2018/04/27/brief-summary-third-wave-of-feminism/.
[vii] Thwaites, ‘Making a choice or taking a stand’, 55; Nicola Rivers, Postfeminism(s) and the Arrival of the Fourth Wave: Turning Tides (Palgrave Macmillan, 2017): 15.
[viii] Marso, ‘Feminism’s Quest,’ 264.
[ix] Snyder-Hall, ‘Defense of Choice,’ 257.
[x] Snyder-Hall, ‘Defense of Choice,’ 255.
[xi] Marso, ‘Feminism’s Quest,’ 263.
[xii] Marso, ‘Feminism’s Quest,’ 265.
[xiii] Rosalind C Gill, “Critical Respect: The Difficulties and Dilemmas of Agency and ‘Choice’ for Feminism,” The European Journal of Women’s Studies 14, no. 1 (2007): 76, https://doi.org/10.1177/1350506807072318.
[xiv] Snyder-Hall ‘Defense of Choice,’ 257.
[xv] Martha C Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000): 137.
[xvi] Sandra Lee Bartky, Femininity and Domination: Studies in the Phenomenology of Oppression (New York: Routledge, 1990): 26-28.
[xvii] Bartky, Femininity and Domination, 22.
[xviii] Bartky, Femininity and Domination, 18
[xix] Bartky, Femininity and Domination, 16.
[xx]Marika Tiggemann, and Suzanna Hodgson, “The Hairlessness Norm Extended: Reasons for and Predictors of Women’s Body Hair Removal at Different Body Sites,” Sex Roles no. 11-12 (2008): 890, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11199-008-9494-3.
[xxi] Snyder-Hall, ‘Defense of Choice,’ 255; Marso, ‘Feminism’s Quest,’ 264.
[xxii] Snyder-Hall, ‘Defense of Choice,’ 257.
[xxiii] Gill, ‘The Difficulties and Dilemmas,’ 72.
[xxiv]Nussbaum, Women and Human Development, 141.
[xxv] Nussbaum, Women and Human Development, 140.
[xxvi]Lori J Marso, “Freedom’s Poses,” Political Research Quarterly 70, no. 4 (2017): 722, http://www.jstor.org/stable/26384811.
[xxvii]Teresa L Erbert, “The Romance of Patriarchy: Ideology, Subjectivity, and Postmodern Feminist Cultural Theory,” Cultural Critique no. 10 (1988): 20, https://doi.org/10.2307/1354105.
[xxviii] Marso, ‘Freedom’s Poses,’ 721.
[xxix]Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed: 30th Anniversary Edition, trans. Myra Bergman Ramos (New York: Continuum International, 2005): 56.
[xxx] Marso, ‘Freedom’s Poses,’ 723.
[xxxi] Jennifer Baxter, “Towards COVID normal: Sharing of housework in couple families,” Australian Institute of Family Studies, September 2021, https://aifs.gov.au/research/research-reports/towards-covid-normal-sharing-housework-couple-families#:~:text=Within%20opposite%2Dsex%20couples%2C%20there,usually%20done%20by%20the%20female.
[xxxii] Australian Bureau of Statistics,“Women spent more time than men on unpaid work in May,” 16 June 2021,https://www.abs.gov.au/media-centre/media-releases/women-spent-more-time-men-unpaid-work-may.
[xxxiii]Julia Wolfe, “Domestic Workers Chartbook,” Economic Policy Institute, 14 May 2020, https://www.epi.org/publication/domestic-workers-chartbook-a-comprehensive-look-at-the-demographics-wages-benefits-and-poverty-rates-of-the-professionals-who-care-for-our-family-members-and-clean-our-homes/.
[xxxiv] David Carter, Literary Theory (Oldcastle Books, 2006): 94.
[xxxv] International Labour Organisation, “These Occupations Are Dominated by Women,” 6 March 2020, https://ilostat.ilo.org/these-occupations-are-dominated-by-women/; Elise Gould, “Care Workers Are Deeply Undervalued and Underpaid,” Economic Policy Institute, 15 July 2021, https://www.epi.org/blog/care-workers-are-deeply-undervalued-and-underpaid-estimating-fair-and-equitable-wages-in-the-care-sectors/.
[xxxvi] David Carter, Literary Theory, 94.
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Gould, Elise. “Care Workers Are Deeply Undervalued and Underpaid.” Economic Policy Institute. 15 July, 2021. https://www.epi.org/blog/care-workers-are-deeply-undervalued-and-underpaid-estimating-fair-and-equitable-wages-in-the-care-sectors/.
International Labour Organisation. “These Occupations Are Dominated by Women.” 6 March 2020. https://ilostat.ilo.org/these-occupations-are-dominated-by-women/.
Laughlin, Kathleen. “Is It Time to Jump Ship? Historians Rethink the Waves Metaphor.” Feminist Formations 22, no. 1 (2010): 76–87. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40835345.
Marso, Lori J. “Feminism’s Quest for Common Desires.” Perspectives on Politics 8, no. 1 (2010): 263–69. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25698534.
Marso, Lori J. “Freedom’s Poses.” Political Research Quarterly 70, no. 4 (2017): 720–27. http://www.jstor.org/stable/26384811.
Nussbaum, Martha C. Women and Human Development: the Capabilities Approach. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
Rivers, Nicola. Postfeminism(s) and the Arrival of the Fourth Wave: Turning Tides. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017.
Snyder-Hall, Claire. “Third-Wave Feminism and the Defense of ‘Choice’.” Perspectives on Politics 8, no. 1 (2010): 255–61. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25698533.
Thwaites, Rachel. “Making a choice or taking a stand? Choice feminism, political engagement and the contemporary feminist movement.” Feminist Theory, 18(1), (2017): 55–68. https://doi.org/10.1177/1464700116683657.
Tiggemann, Marika, and Suzanna Hodgson. “The Hairlessness Norm Extended: Reasons for and Predictors of Women’s Body Hair Removal at Different Body Sites.” Sex Roles,no. 11-12 (2008): 889–97. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11199-008-9494-3.
Wolfe, Julia. “Domestic Workers Chartbook.” Economic Policy Institute. 14 May 2020. https://www.epi.org/publication/domestic-workers-chartbook-a-comprehensive-look-at-the-demographics-wages-benefits-and-poverty-rates-of-the-professionals-who-care-for-our-family-members-and-clean-our-homes/.
Featured photo by Olayinka Babalola on Unsplash
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