By Sithara-Anne French
Humans are remarkably adaptable when it comes to our preference formation. This is seen in everyday scenarios: someone might claim that they dislike receiving flowers to avoid the awkward truth that their partner never gives them any, or they might say that they don’t like getting their hair wet when the truth is they cannot swim. Whilst these examples provide us with humorous anecdotes, adaptive preferences can have far more serious implications.
External social pressures play a significant role in our preference formation. In patriarchal societies, for instance, problematic gender norms normalise oppressive behaviours such as intimate partner violence (IPV). This is further complicated by victims internalising these norms, leading them to tolerate abuse. Feminist philosophers refer to these preferences as “deformed”,[i] highlighting their morally problematic nature. In contrast, while innocuous preferences may also be shaped by social influences, they do not arise from or perpetuate oppressive conditions.
From this emerges the question: should victims of IPV be prevented from returning to their partners, even if they want to? While this decision constitutes an autonomy impairment, I argue that restricting victims’ choices fails to address the depth of the psychological harms produced by oppressive circumstances. Instead, in this article I explore how feminist theories of adaptive preferences, particularly those advanced by Natalie Stoljar, Rosa Terlazzo and Serene Khader, help us understand the interplay between oppression and autonomy. By tracing the shortcomings of state paternalism and the limitations of Khader’s model, I argue that meaningful autonomy for victims can only be fostered through interventions that dismantle internalised gender norms and provide targeted, attainable alternatives that replace the benefits found in abusive relationships. Expanding victims’ options, rather than restricting their choices, offers a more respectful and effective pathway toward genuine empowerment.
To distinguish innocuous from deformed preferences, we must firstly understand the context in which the latter are formed. The morally problematic nature of adaptive preferences stems from the fact that they are formed under oppressive circumstances where an agent’s options are severely limited. This is a survival mechanism often employed by victims to avoid the discomfort produced by these limitations.[ii] However, the unconscious adjustment of an agent’s preferences to fit these circumstances reinforces the oppression responsible for those limitations in the first place. This unconscious causal mechanism turns adaptive preferences into autonomy deficits as individuals are unaware of the oppressive circumstances influencing their preference formation.
One might question how the decision to return to an abusive partner aligns with this conception of adaptive preferences. After all, having the choice between returning to your abuser or living an independent life doesn’t seem to be a restricted set of options. However, this overlooks the indirect psychological harms that often accompany oppression. In her psychological processes model of adaptive preferences, Stoljar explains how oppressive circumstances can undermine a victim’s capacity for critical reflection. The restriction of an individual’s options over an extended period can inhibit their ability to critically reflect on their preferences as oppressive stereotypes come to be seen as natural.[iii] Gendered norms, such as the stereotype that men are inherently more rational, are one such example that might lead female victims of IPV to believe that they cannot live independently without their partners.[iv] Given that women are often exposed to these norms from infanthood, such pervasive ideals can cultivate adaptive preferences that mirror and reinforce patriarchal ideologies. Therefore, although the decision to return to an abusive partner may appear to be an autonomous choice, it’s deeply informed by oppressive stereotypes. In this context, abuse comes to be seen as the acceptable price for a woman to pay for the benefits accorded to her by her relationship. The internalisation of oppressive gender stereotypes inhibits these women from viewing this transaction as problematic. This impairs their ability to critically reflect on their preference to return to their partner thus, restricting their autonomy.
Although we have established that the preference to return to an abusive partner is an autonomy impairment, this doesn’t mean that individuals who hold this preference should be prevented from doing so. Terlazzo identifies that emphasising the autonomy deficits of victims can compound their disenfranchisement. Clinging to the idea that victims are psychologically flawed enables powerful actors to “substitute their… judgements for those of more vulnerable actors”.[v] This is seen in the no-drop protocol (NDP) implemented by New York County where perpetrators of IPV are arrested regardless of their partner’s cooperation.[vi] But whyis this solution problematic? Terlazzo locates the problematic nature of these interventions in their failure to accord the respect to victims that they are fundamentally owed as agents capable of directing their own lives.[vii] Autonomy is often treated as a dichotomous concept where an agent either possesses this capacity, or they don’t. However, grounding intervention in respect allows us to treat autonomy as a more fluid concept. What matters is not whether an individual’s preferences are autonomous, but that they possess the capacity to make autonomous alterations to their preferences.[viii] Interventions that strip away this respect from victims can inhibit this capacity by eroding the capacity of the victim to autonomously identify alternative life paths.
For example, critics of the NDP point out that for women experiencing IPV, their relationship also provides them with benefits such as financial support and a sense of purpose.[ix] Preventing women from returning to their relationships and accessing these benefits shifts their dependency to the state. This not only fails to provide these victims with the opportunity to build up their independence[x] but on a more fundamental level, it fails to address the underlying stereotypes shaping their adaptive preferences. Instead, preventing women from returning to their partner buys into the very stereotypes that shaped their preferences in the first place as it treats women as vapid agents who are incapable of directing their own lives. Rather than fostering victims’ independence and confidence to make decisions that align with their genuine preferences, such interventions exemplify state paternalism. By positioning the state as a rational authority that assumes to know what is best for victims, these measures replicate the same dynamics of control present in abusive relationships. In both cases, external actors substitute their own judgements for those of the victim, denying victims the opportunity to exercise and develop their autonomy. Consequently, these interventions fail to dismantle the gendered stereotypes that underlie adaptive preferences but instead reinforce them, treating women as incapable of directing their own lives.
Some philosophers go even a step further, claiming that adaptive preferences shouldn’t be viewed as autonomy impairments. Khader argues that the problematic nature of adaptive preferences can be located not in their status as autonomy impairments, but in their incompatibility with basic flourishing.[xi] Khader draws this conclusion from her argument that many adaptive preferences are consciously formed.[xii] This is evident in the way in which the decision to return to an abusive partner appears to be consciously made. Khader argues that broadening the scope of options available to an agent will eradicate the morally problematic nature of adaptive preferences because “an agent’s true preferences are those she would endorse under conditions conducive to her basic wellbeing”.[xiii] There are several problems with this model of adaptive preferences. Firstly, it fails to adequately define what constitutes basic flourishing. Khader doesn’t believe that this is a significant lacuna in her theory.[xiv] However, in the case of victims of IPV who see their relationship as integral to their basic flourishing, it blurs the line between viable alternatives. Secondly, according to Khader’s model, the decision to return to an abusive partner doesn’t constitute an adaptive preference given that these individuals are exposed to alternatives that could promote their basic flourishing. However, this overlooks the profound effect that internalised oppression can have on an individual’s ability to perceive the value in their alternatives.
For women who have been indoctrinated by gender stereotypes to believe that they are incapable of living an independent life, leaving their relationship is not a viable alternative. Not only have these women been denied the opportunity to cultivate the capacity to exercise their genuine autonomy, but this also presents the risk that they will transfer their dependency onto another controlling actor. This dependency may manifest in the form of reliance on the state or in entering another relationship marked by similar patterns of control. In either case, the underlying structures of oppression remain unchallenged, perpetuating the very conditions that inhibit the autonomy of the victim in the first place. This leads to the final flaw in Khader’s theory, namely, it assumes that some adaptive preferences are consciously made. Considering that adaptive preferences are produced by oppressive circumstances that often have deep psychological origins, Khader’s account significantly downplays these harms. Fundamentally, it overlooks the impact that this unconscious causal mechanism can have in coercing victims to accept abusive behaviour. This suggests that the philosophical understanding of adaptive preferences needs to be expanded to account for the psychological harms produced by oppression.[xv]
While preventing victims from returning to their abuser appears to be a necessary protective measure to ensure their well-being, as identified in the preceding discussion, this can produce further harm. However, this doesn’t rule out the possibility of implementing alternative measures that could replace the perceived benefits that victims locate in their relationships. For example, creating safe spaces where women can cultivate meaningful connections, explore new interests, and learn how to be financially independent could instil a sense of purpose that doesn’t come at the cost of abuse. My conclusion thus diverges from Khader’s in the specificity of the alternatives proposed. While Khader maintains that simply expanding the range of options available to an agent can correct the moral deficits of adaptive preferences, I argue that these alternatives must be intentionally structured to displace the concrete benefits that victims locate in their abusive relationships, such as financial security, emotional connection, and perceived protection. Moreover, these alternatives must be perceived by victims as being attainable. For example, programs that foster financial literacy, peer support, and mentorship from women who have overcome similar circumstances can create genuine pathways toward independence. Without these targeted and realistic supports, merely expanding the theoretical scope of alternatives fails to generate meaningful autonomy. As identified by Martha C. Nussbaum, exposing victims to a greater scope of attainable alternatives can encourage them to see the value in these options.[xvi] Strategies such as these could reshape victims’ preferences and empower them to make autonomous choices without impugning their dignity.
Exploring the implications of adaptive preferences helps us gain a deeper understanding of the impacts of oppression. By building on these insights, we can develop responses that are sensitive to victims’ psychological realities while avoiding the pitfalls of state paternalism. Ultimately, addressing intimate partner violence requires more than merely protecting victims from harm. It demands confronting the systemic structures that perpetuate dependency. Challenging internalised gender stereotypes and creating spaces where women can cultivate autonomy through targeted, attainable forms of support are crucial steps toward this goal. Only through such measures can we replace cycles of coercion with genuine empowerment
Sithara-Anne French recently completed her Bachelor of Politics, Philosophy and Economics (Honours) at the University of Queensland. Her interests lie in feminist philosophy and the philosophy of decolonisation, with a particular focus on how power structures shape autonomy and agency. She hopes to pursue further study and undertake a Doctor of Philosophy in the future.
Featured image: Young Woman Looking Through a Window by Johann Georg Meyer (1887).
Bibliography
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[i] Steven Weimer, “Political efficacy, respect for agency, and adaptive preferences,” Journal of Global Ethics 13, no. 3 (2017): 326, https://doi.org/10.1080/17449626.2017.1422530.
[ii] Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 62-63.
[iii] Natalie Stoljar, “Autonomy and Adaptive Preference Formation,” in Autonomy, Oppression, and Gender, Studies in Feminist Philosophy, ed. Andrea Veltman and Mark Piper (New York: Oxford Academic, 2014), 235-236.
[iv] Sandra Lee Bartky, Femininity and Domination (New York: Routledge, 1990), 24.
[v] Rosa Terlazzo, “Conceptualizing Adaptive Preferences Respectfully: An Indirectly Substantive Account,” The Journal of Political Philosophy 24, no.2 (2016): 208, https://doi.org/10.1111/jopp.12062.
[vi] Gauthier-Chung, Maud Faïle, “Hounded Women: The IPV Protocol and the Autonomy of Abuse Victims,” Moral Philosophy and Politics 4 no. 1 (2017): 68, https://doi.org/10.1515/mopp-2016-0039.
[vii] Terlazzo, “Conceptualizing Adaptive Preferences Respectfully,” 24: 209.
[viii] Gauthier-Chung, Maud Faïle, “Hounded Women,” 4: 73.
[ix] Gauthier-Chung, Maud Faïle, “Hounded Women,” 4: 80.
[x] Gauthier-Chung, Maud Faïle, “Hounded Women,” 4: 81.
[xi] Serene J. Khader, Adaptive Preferences and Women’s Empowerment 1st ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 17.
[xii] Khader, Adaptive Preferences and Women’s Empowerment, 13.
[xiii] Serene J. Khader, “Must Theorising about Adaptive Preferences Deny Women’s Agency?,” Journal of Applied Philosophy 29 no. 4 (2012): 311, https://www.jstor.org/stable/24356185.
[xiv] Khader, “Must Theorising about Adaptive Preferences Deny Women’s Agency?,” 29: 311.
[xv] Sandra Lee Bartky, Femininity and Domination (New York: Routledge, 1990), 30.
[xvi] Martha C. Nussbaum, “Adaptive Preferences and Women’s Options,” in Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 111.
EXORDIUM 