By Georgia Farmer
Moral motivation continues to be a point of significant tension in normative literature, with two distinct camps forming around opposing views of the role of external motivation in ethical decision making. At one end of the spectrum, motivational internalists contend that moral judgement (an individual’s rational judgement that something is right or wrong) is sufficient to motivate moral action.[1] On the other, motivational externalists claim that “any connection that exists between moral judgment and motivation is purely contingent.”[2] Thus, to motivational externalists, the external motivations which inform moral action are a distinct issue in and of themselves. Beyond just determining what actions are morally sound, motivational externalists must also account for what factors will motivate an individual to carry out such actions. Presupposing the inevitability of this tension, William Grey’s 1993 paper, “Anthropocentrism and Deep Ecology”, attempts to navigate the externalist motivation problem by balancing normative concerns of ecology against what he considers to be “habitually assume[d] characteristically anthropocentric [human-centric] perspectives”.[3]
The term “deep ecology”, as Grey points out, refers to a “cluster of [various] non-anthropocentric ethics.”[4] It emerged as a movement in the 1970s that responded to a perceived lack of “connectedness, reciprocity and simplicity” in the ecological ethics dominant in Western society at that time.[5] Although deep ecology exists in various forms, its key principles concern “connectedness to nature, biospherical egalitarianism, wilderness preservation, population management, biodiversity, and reduction of resource use.”[6] Importantly, Grey notes that across the spectrum of polymorphic belief, deep ecology is unified in its key underpinning claim that “nonhuman individuals merit the same consideration…which Kant thought should be extended only to rational beings.”[7]
Responding to deep ecology’s Kantian claim, Grey argues that “the attempt to provide a genuinely non-anthropocentric set of values…is a hopeless quest.”[8] He thus suggests that anthropocentrism is an inevitability of the human psyche; it is a reality reflected by human action and thus an inescapable problem for the ethicist, regardless of more idealistic notions of a truly ‘eco-centric’ ethics. The persuasiveness of a normative theory of environmental ethics is thus, in Grey’s view, highly contingent on its capacity to externally motivate. Although Grey does not engage explicitly with the moral motivation debate, his assertion that anthropocentrism is necessitated by human motivation firmly situates his claims within this discourse.
Responding to a supposed inevitability of anthropocentric belief, Grey recommends a moderate conception of anthropocentrism as an answer to deep ecology’s core concerns of human supremacism, unconstrained resource depletion, and short-term small-mindedness.[9] He argues that a “a suitably enriched (non-atomistic) conception of humans as an integral part of larger systems…means that anthropocentric concern for our own well-being naturally flows on to concern for the nonhuman world.”[10] He thus contends that an appropriately qualified anthropocentrism is not only coheres with the human condition but is in fact conducive to the promotion of a “rich, diverse and vibrant biosphere.”[11]
As per Brennan and Lo, most standard formulations of anthropocentrism can be divided into those conceived in the strong sense and those conceived in the weak sense. The former is defined as assigning “intrinsic value to human beings alone” and the latter as assigning “a significantly greater amount of intrinsic value to human beings…[such] that the protection or promotion of human interests…at the expense of non-human things turns out to be nearly always justified.”[12] Grey’s prescribed anthropocentrism defies both proposed definitions, suggesting that a human-centred ethics, with appropriate qualifiers, deduces a net good for both humankind and the environment.
Grey’s primary qualifier for an appropriate conception of anthropocentrism is scope. This is made obvious in his summation that John Passmore’s view of proximity—that is, that “we can extend concern only to a world that we can rationally conjecture to be recognisably human”—should not be taken to mean that concern cannot extend “over centuries, rather than years or decades.”[13] It is Grey’s view that previous ‘shallow’ anthropocentric accounts have failed to adequately consider the scope of what constitutes a human-centric ethics. As he contends, “the problem with so-called ‘shallow’ views lies not in their anthropocentrism, but rather with the fact that they are characteristically short-term, sectional, and self-regarding.”[14] Grey argues that the problem of biosphere collapse is distinctly human, noting that the biosphere can survive extreme environmental changes (albeit in a modified state), whereas human life cannot.[15] He therefore argues that human-centric conceptions of ethics should consider a broadened scope of anthropocentrism, a ‘benevolent’ reformulation of ‘shallow’ views which extends beyond current human life to consider future generations and life beyond.
The issue of this broadened scope of concern in Grey’s benevolent anthropocentrism is not its aspirational character, but its erosion of the underpinning motivational externalism which fuels the key premises of his anthropocentrism. As stated above, one of Grey’s primary contentions against ‘eco-centric’ or ‘bio-centric’ ecologies is that they fail to recognise humankind’s inherent humancentric preoccupation. However, in disavowing the motivational persuasiveness of deep ecology, Grey inadvertently undermines the coherence of his argument for a ‘deep’ anthropocentrism.
As Grey points out, prior conceptions of anthropocentrism—such as Passmore’s view that concern can only be extended to what we recognize and love—highlight specifically the limiting nature of humancentric ethics.[16] In response, Grey asserts that such a conception of anthropocentrism needlessly constricts the scope of what should be reasonably assumed as a human concern. He does not, however, provide a motivation for why it is a human concern for humans now. In defending the position of anthropocentrism as inescapable due to the human tendency to “habitually assume characteristically anthropocentric perspectives,” Grey risks incoherence, since he asserts a human capacity to overcome one deeply ingrained human motivation whilst being simultaneously beholden to the other.[17]
As human history would demonstrate, selfishness (that which Grey enunciates as being ‘short-term, sectional, and self-regarding’) is a trait which has long coloured all aspects of human action. Industrialisation throughout history has frequently been pursued at the cost of not only the biosphere but also human wellbeing. As research from the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis reveals, the effects of climate change are borne disproportionately by vulnerable communities whilst being primarily fuelled by the personal interests and industrial efforts of the ultra-wealthy. According to the Institute’s findings, the “top 1% of the wealthiest individuals globally contribute 26 times the global average to increases in monthly 1-in-100-year heat extremes globally and 17 times more to Amazon droughts.”[18] Illuminating the incommensurate effects of these extreme climate events, the Institute notes that “emissions from the wealthiest 10% of individuals in the United States and China alone, each led to a two-to threefold increase in heat extremes across vulnerable regions.”[19] Thus, human selfishness is not a motivational issue restricted merely to human/non-human interaction, but a problem that must be navigated even within the confines of a purely anthropocentric ethics. Given this, Grey’s anthropocentric ethics should provide an external motivation for the benevolent action which he prescribes in his broadening scope premise. In the absence of such an account, Grey’s insistence on a necessitated anthropocentrism loses its argumentative power. Instead, one is left to follow a reductio to its natural conclusion. Either anthropocentrism is necessitated by motivational externalism or benevolent action is possible regardless of external motivation, but neither appear to be able to exist without risking the coherence of the other. Given the impossibility of resolving this tension, one is forced to reconsider whether external motivation is in fact an appropriate measure for determining the effectiveness of an environmental ethics in the first place.
According to Grey’s own broadening scope premise, even if one were to accept anthropocentrism, an appeal to a rational aspirational model of ethics is at some point essential to effect any significant change for the current trajectory of the climate crisis. As he points out, limiting notions which appeal to human nature, such as Passmore’s proximity claim, fail to recognise the climate crisis as an evolving problem that requires solutions now for generations to come. Human benevolence is thus not merely a question of human motivation or nature but a question of necessity. Grey recognises this as a distinctly human problem; however, it is not a problem for humans alone. Though Grey notes, “life will go on… the arthropods, algae and the ubiquitous bacteria, at least,” it is clear that it is not only humankind that has much to lose if the earth continues to be pillaged for resources and polluted by human industrialisation.[20] Bacteria and algae may survive, but entire species of plant and animal life will, like humankind, be wiped from existence. Thus, the question stands: Why should a rational aspirationalist model of ethics only extend to humankind? What prevents the adoption of a truly bio-centric ethics beyond mere arbitrary distinction?
Grey might argue that even if a strong application of motivational externalism (as I have proposed) fails in proving the necessity of anthropocentrism, it remains preferable over deep ecology for various other reasons. Continuing his critique, Grey suggests that deep ecology risks an incoherence in its competing concerns of human exceptionalism and unrestrained human depletion of natural resources. On one hand, Grey suggests that deep ecologists “extoll the virtues of the natural… [and vilify] the man-made” by advocating against unchecked human resource depletion. On the other hand, they argue against any distinction erected between humans and the natural world.[21] Noting this tension, he suggests that deep ecologists are “able to save themselves…with the help of a little covert anthropocentrism” by recognising “humans as an integral part of larger systems…[meaning that] anthropocentric concern for our own well-being naturally flows on to concern for the nonhuman world.”[22] Whilst Grey presents a compelling case for the integration of humans as an integral part of the biosphere, his logic can easily be applied in the inverse with similar results. A biocentric ethics, for example, recognising the individual value of non-human life and practicing ethical concern for it would similarly result in a flow on effect for human flourishing also. Care for the environment would lead to an improved state of the biosphere, which would subsequently cultivate improved living conditions for all creatures. It is therefore clear that a humancentric ethics is not the only ethical framework that can include human flourishing as a legitimate part. In the absence of a necessitated motivational externalism, the reasons for asserting anthropocentrism as inevitable grow increasingly less compelling and more arbitrary. Faced with similarly effective rational aspirationalist alternatives, anthropocentrism reveals itself as a descriptive trap. It describes a human affliction without providing any meaningful challenge to it. It thus treats an “is” as an “ought”, condemning environmental ethics to a structural pessimism which undermines the very nature of its project.
In conclusion, motivational externalism presents a weak case for the necessity of anthropocentrism. In the absence of a compelling or coherent application, one must deduce that distinctions drawn between human and non-human life within William Grey’s proposed benevolent anthropocentrism are merely arbitrary. Applying Grey’s own broadening scope premise, benevolent action need not prevent moral consideration from extending beyond humanity to capture the interests of non-human life facing the same threat of extinction as we do. Whilst, as Grey notes, this is often a practice of balancing (sometimes competing) interests of human and non-human life, rational aspirationalism provides an essential basis by which environmental ethics transforms beyond something merely descriptive to something which is also prescriptive. The fate of life on earth must therefore lie in a hope beyond mere human nature; a trust that there are those who are willing to lay aside selfishness for the greater good of all.
Georgia is completing her final semester of a Bachelor of Arts at UQ, majoring in Philosophy and English Literature. Her philosophical interests include AI ethics, environmental ethics, ontology, and philosophy of the mind. She plans to commence her Honours year at UQ in 2027.
Bibliography
Brennan, Andrew, and Norva Y. S. Lo. “Environmental Ethics.” Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (2024). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2024/entries/ethics-environmental/.
Grey, William. “Anthropocentrism and Deep Ecology.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (2006): 463-75. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048409312345442.
Smith, William, and Annette Gough. “Deep Ecology as a framework for student eco-philosophical thinking.” Journal of Philosophy in Schools 2 (2015): 38-55. https://researchrepository.rmit.edu.au/esploro/outputs/journalArticle/Deep-Ecology-as-a-framework-for/9921859920701341.
Passmore, John. Man’s Responsibility for Nature. Duckworth, 1974.
Rosati, Connie S. “Moral Motivation.” Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (2016). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/moral-motivation/.
Schleussner, Carl, and Ansa Heyl. “The world’s wealthiest 10% caused two thirds of global warming since 1990.” International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis. 7 May 2025. https://iiasa.ac.at/news/may-2025/worlds-wealthiest-10-caused-two-thirds-of-global-warming-since-1990.
[1] Connie S. Rosati, “Moral Motivation,” Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (2016), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/moral-motivation/.
[2] Connie S. Rosati, “Moral Motivation.”
[3] William Grey, “Anthropocentrism and Deep Ecology,” Australasian 4 (2006): 466, Journal of Philosophy, 71, https://doi.org/10.1080/00048409312345442.
[4] William Grey, “Anthropocentrism and Deep Ecology,” 463.
[5] William Smith, and Annette Gough, “Deep Ecology as a framework for student eco-philosophical thinking,” Journal of Philosophy in Schools, 2 (2015): 39, https://researchrepository.rmit.edu.au/esploro/outputs/journalArticle/Deep-Ecology-as-a-framework-for/9921859920701341.
[6] William Smith, and Annette Gough, “Deep Ecology as a framework for student eco-philosophical thinking,” 39.
[7] William Grey, “Anthropocentrism and Deep Ecology,” 465.
[8] William Grey, “Anthropocentrism and Deep Ecology,” 473.
[9] William Grey, “Anthropocentrism and Deep Ecology,” 465.
[10] William Grey, “Anthropocentrism and Deep Ecology,” 465.
[11] William Grey, “Anthropocentrism and Deep Ecology,” 473.
[12] Andrew Brennan, and Norva Y. S. Lo, “Environmental Ethics,” Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (2024), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2024/entries/ethics-environmental/.
[13] William Grey, “Anthropocentrism and Deep Ecology,” 465.
[14] William Grey, “Anthropocentrism and Deep Ecology,” 466.
[15] William Grey, “Anthropocentrism and Deep Ecology,” 467.
[16] John Passmore, Man’s Responsibility for Nature, Duckworth, 1974.
[17] William Grey, “Anthropocentrism and Deep Ecology,” 466.
[18] Carl Schleussner and Ansa Heyl, “The world’s wealthiest 10% caused two thirds of global warming since 1990,” International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis,” 7 May 2025, https://iiasa.ac.at/news/may-2025/worlds-wealthiest-10-caused-two-thirds-of-global-warming-since-1990.
[19] Carl Schleussner and Ansa Heyl, “The world’s wealthiest 10%,” International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis.”
[20] William Grey, “Anthropocentrism and Deep Ecology,” 469.
[21] William Grey, “Anthropocentrism and Deep Ecology,” 466.
[22] William Grey, “Anthropocentrism and Deep Ecology,” 466.
Featured Image: Mikhail Nesterov, Lonely Woman, oil on canvas, 1922.
